Understanding the evolution of parental care is complicated by the occurrence of evolutionary conflicts of interest within the family, variation in the quality and state of family members, and repeated bouts of investment in a family of offspring. As a result, family members are expected to negotiate over care. We present a model for the resolution of sexual conflict in which parents negotiate over repeated bouts of care. Negotiation is mediated by parents deciding at the start of each bout how much care to give on the basis of the state (mass) of offspring, which reflects the amount of care previously received. The evolutionarily stable pattern of care depends on whether the parents care together for the whole family, or each cares alone for part of the divided family. When they care together, they provide less care in the first bout, more in the last bout, and less care overall, resulting in lower parental and offspring fitness. Our results emphasize that negotiation over parental care may occur as a means of avoiding exploitation owing to sexual conflict, even in the absence of variation in the quality of either sex of parent, and lead to a reduction in fitness.
INTRODUCTION
Family life is one of the most familiar forms of social behaviour, yet we are still far from a complete understanding of the selection pressures shaping patterns of parental care [1] . The main reason for this is the widespread occurrence of evolutionary conflicts of interest between family members [2] . As a result of these conflicts, the fitness consequences of an individual's behaviour depend partly on the behaviour of other individuals, and game theory models are needed to determine the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs). Moreover, parental care often involves repeated bouts of investment, and, even within a particular family role, individuals may vary in ways that either affect the fitness consequences of their actions, or those of others ('quality'), or are affected by their actions or those of others ('state'; e.g. 'condition') [3] . As a result, family members are expected to negotiate over parental care, and we need to understand how negotiation rules, as opposed to specific levels of care, evolve in order to understand patterns of parental care [4] .
Sexual conflict is one of the major evolutionary conflicts of interest within the family and concerns how much care the two parents should each provide to joint offspring. Sexual conflict occurs because, in fitness terms, both parents benefit from care given by either of the parents, whereas each parent pays the cost of only its own care. The result is that a parent's fitness would be maximized by the other parent providing a larger share of the care than that parent is selected to give [5, 6] . How, then, do parents resolve this conflict over parental investment, particularly when there is biparental care?
The first model to address this question was developed by Houston & Davies [7] . Their model assumes that there is effectively only one bout of investment in which the care that each parent provides constitutes a 'sealed bid' which cannot be changed in response to the investment of its partner. Their central insight is that, if each parent invests at a level that gives it highest fitness given the investment of its mate, there are some conditions under which biparental care is evolutionarily stable (ES). They reexpressed the selection pressures encapsulated in the relationships between fitness cost to the parent or fitness benefit through the offspring, and the amount of care given or received as 'best response curves', which specify the best evolutionary response to a given fixed level of investment by the other sex of parent.
Subsequently, these 'best response curves' were widely misinterpreted as applying not only on an evolutionary time scale, but also to negotiation between the members of a pair on a behavioural time scale (see references in [4] ). However, McNamara et al. [4] pointed out that the Houston -Davies best response rules are not ES negotiation rules. This is because some mutant negotiation response rules can exploit the fact that the partner compensates for their lack of effort, so giving the mutant parent higher fitness. Their important insight was that new models are needed for negotiation on a behavioural time scale.
McNamara et al. [4, 8] developed a model in which negotiation involved the members of a pair making alternate bids until their efforts settle down to stable values. The fitness payoffs to the parents depend only on these final values, and the negotiation phase itself is assumed to be cost-and (implicitly) benefit-free (offspring fitness is not directly affected by the size of the bids during the bidding process, but only indirectly via the subsequent amount of investment). In their model, the need for negotiation is driven evolutionarily by variation in mate quality that affects the mate's cost of reproduction, and hence its likely investment, but that can only be ascertained through the negotiation process. The ES negotiation rules result in the final bids being 'honest' in the sense that they reflect an individual's quality, but the negotiated levels of investment are lower than in a Houston -Davies game in which each member of the pair knows its mate's quality without entering into a negotiation process [4] .
McNamara et al.'s model is important in identifying the need for models involving repeated interaction within a pair, but the interpretation of their model is not entirely clear. The bids in the negotiation phase are not parental investment, because they carry neither fitness benefits (through the offspring) nor costs (to the parent's residual fitness), so the most straightforward interpretation is that the negotiation and investment phases are entirely separate. Under this interpretation, the parents cease negotiation once investment begins, and parental care is therefore effectively a single sealed bid, even if care is given in repeated bouts. However, the resultant response rules would not be ES: the negotiated efforts in the McNamara et al. model are less than the ES levels of investment in the Houston -Davies game, so mutants of either sex who invest more than their final bid will have higher fitness. For example, figure 1 shows using McNamara et al. 's [4] fig. 2 that a mutant male who invests more than his final bid will have higher fitness. The problem is that under cost-free negotiation, there is nothing that binds a parent to investing its final bid in the negotiation process during the investment phase. The mutation shown in figure 1 will not itself be ES: similar mutations (in the function specifying the amount to be invested in relation to the final bid in the negotiation process) will also be selected in females, and these mutations will in turn select for different negotiation rules. It is difficult to see how there could be a set of ES negotiation and final bid-investment rules: an individual's ES level of investment depends on the quality of its mate. Individuals are therefore selected to 'lie' in the negotiation process in order to increase the investment by their mate. However, such lying is assumed not to have costs, so there are no fitness components that can balance the benefits of lying and create an evolutionary equilibrium. Models are needed in which there are costs to the bidding process [9] .
A second interpretation of the formal mathematics of McNamara et al. [4] which they did not explicitly make is that there is no separation between the negotiation and investment phase. Instead, the efforts settle down quickly to stable values, so that it is a reasonable approximation to ignore costs and benefits during this period and assume that payoffs depend only on the final 'agreed' efforts. In this case, the argument above-that a mutant that increases its investment above its final bid can invade-no longer holds. This is because in this second interpretation there is no final bid; the partner will continue to respond to any changes in effort by the mutant and this will more than nullify any advantage the mutant would otherwise gain. Thus in this interpretation, the negotiated rule is ES among the kinds of rule considered. However, these are restricted to rules that are the same throughout the rearing period, and in particular, parents cannot change how they respond towards the end of the period.
Given these problems inherent in the work of McNamara et al. [4] , we developed new models in which the negotiation and investment phases are not separate, and negotiation rules are allowed to depend on time during the rearing period. Specifically, there is a series of bouts of investment, with investment carrying both costs and benefits, and each parent can assess the amount of care that the offspring have already received via their state (mass), and modify its investment in later bouts in response.
THE MODELS (a) The Houston -Davies model
The Houston-Davies model [7] asks how much parental investment parents should make when raising a family together. The parental care strategies of each of the two parents are modelled as single quantities and constitute sealed bids: neither parent can modify its behaviour in relation to that of its mate. The male and female each decide how much care, c m and c f , to provide, and the care is divided equally between a family of N identical young. The fitness gain to the parents, b, through each offspring depends on the total amount of care that the offspring receives, ((c m þ c f )/N), and increases monotonically, but at a decelerating rate, with the total care received (figure 2a; i.e. of sex i mated to a parent of sex j is then ( [7] ; electronic supplementary material, appendix S1): 
Thus, the ES care strategies of the two parents occur when the slope of the offspring benefit curve equals the slopes of each of the two parental cost curves, given the constraint that the total care given by the two parents equals the total amount of care received by the offspring. The Houston -Davies model can be simplified to give the ES amount of care under uniparental care: As in the Houston -Davies model, parental care by either parent increases the fitness benefit through the offspring, but carries a fitness cost to the parent providing the care (figure 2). However, because there are repeated bouts of investment, assumptions need to be made about how these costs and benefits combine over successive bouts. The model presented in detail here assumes that the fitness benefit through the offspring depends only on their mass at the end of the final bout of care, M T , with each offspring weighing 0 at birth and growing in each bout by an amount equal to the amount of care they receive during the bout. As a result, their terminal mass, M T , equals the total amount of care they receive, P T t¼1 ðc m;t þ c f ;t Þ=N, where T is the number of bouts of care (assuming that care is evenly distributed among offspring). Their fitness depends only on this, and not how care is distributed across the bouts. By contrast, the parental fitness costs are assumed to depend on the amount of care given in a bout, with the fitness costs per bout summed across all the bouts to give the overall fitness cost. As a result, the total cost of care to a parent is related to the total amount of care, but also depends on how care is distributed between bouts, being minimized when care is spread equally between bouts if the cost function is the same for all bouts. Fitness costs are not paid until after the termination of parental care, so that the fitness of parent i, mated to parent j, is:
Models in which the overall benefit is the sum across bouts of the benefit per bout and/or the overall cost is a function of the sum across bouts of the amount of care given are also briefly considered (electronic supplementary material, appendix S1). The ES amounts of care by the male and female at time t depend on the mass of each offspring at the end of the previous bout of care, M t -1 , and can be found using dynamic programming by working backwards from the final bout of care. The relationships between the ES amount of care by a given parent in a bout, c * i;t , and the mass of each offspring at the end of the previous bout, M t21 , for each parent and bout are the ES behavioural rules by which the parents negotiate over parental care. ES patterns of care were obtained in two ways. , and represent parents of increasing quality (lower cost for a given level of care).
First, qualitative results were obtained analytically (electronic supplementary material, appendix S1). These results apply to any offspring benefit and parental cost functions of the general form shown in figure 2 (i.e. b 0 . 0, b 00 , 0, k 0 . 0 and k 00 . 0). Second, numerical results were obtained for the specific benefit and cost functions shown in figure 2 (see electronic supplementary material, appendix S2). The parameter g i in the cost function determines how quickly a parent's cost of care rises with the amount of care given (figure 2b), and is therefore an inverse measure of parental quality. In all numerical solutions, the cost functions for a parent were assumed to be the same in all bouts of investment. In some analyses, the cost functions were assumed to be the same for the two parents, and in others to differ between the two parents. In comparing patterns of care for different numbers of bouts of care, the cost functions were adjusted by varying the value of g i , so that the total cost of a given amount of care spread evenly over the rearing period was the same, independent of the number of bouts. All of the analyses assume that the quality of the other parent is known before any investment takes place (populations without variation within-sex in quality, or with reliable cues or signals of quality). Thus at the ESS, parents are adapted to their own and partner's cost functions.
In assessing the effect of negotiation on ES patterns of parental care and their fitness consequences, we compared biparental care of undivided families ('parents care together') with two other situations: the first is when the parents divide the family and each cares alone for part of it. The fitness of a parent is then the benefit through offspring raised by either itself or its partner, minus the costs of its own care. In such a divided family, the number of offspring cared for in total by the two parents is the same, but the parents no longer negotiate over care. Comparing this case with parents caring together for an undivided family, therefore, reveals the effect of negotiation on the amount of care and parental and offspring fitness. In the second case, which is mentioned briefly for completeness, one parent cares for the entire family (cf. [8] ). We refer to these two cases as 'parents care alone', and qualify this as necessary to indicate whether the family is divided or the entire family cared for by one parent.
RESULTS
(a) Single bout of investment: parents care alone versus together When there is a single bout of investment that is a sealed bid, the two parents give the same amount of care to the offspring when caring together for the family (the Houston-Davies game) as if they divide the family and each care for part of it, provided that the family is split in the same ratio as their ES amounts of care when caring together ( [10] and electronic supplementary material, appendix S3). If the parents have the same cost function, this means that they give the same amount of care when caring together as if they divide the family equally. Because the parents give the same amount of care in either case, the fitness the parents gain through the offspring, B, the parental fitness costs, C, and the fitness of each of the parents, B-C, are also the same, whether the family is divided or not (see figure 3a-c for T ¼ 1) .
(i) One parent cares alone for the whole family In this case, the single parent provides more care than when caring together with the other parent (the Houston -Davies game), but provides less care than the pair would have done in total [8] . As a result, the fitness benefit to the parents through the offspring is lower, g was set at (0.5 Â 10 25 )T, so that the overall cost of reproduction for a given total of investment spread evenly over all the bouts was the same, independent of the number of bouts of investment.
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and the caring parent pays a higher parental cost and has lower fitness.
(b) Repeated bouts of care: parents care alone When a parent cares alone (for a part of, or the whole, family), and the parental cost function is the same for all bouts of care, parental care is spread evenly over successive bouts of investment (figure 3a; see electronic supplementary material, appendix S1 for the general case). The temporal pattern of care is constant because the fitness benefit through the offspring depends only on their terminal mass, and not how care is distributed through the rearing period, whereas the costs that the parent pays for providing care are accelerating functions of the amount of care that it provides in each bout of care. As a result, the total cost is minimized by spreading care evenly through the rearing period (in a manner analogous to risk-spreading when there is a trade-off between gaining energy and avoiding predation [11] ). When the parental cost function varies between bouts of investment, the ES pattern of care is such that the marginal cost of care is the same in all bouts, and is unaffected by the sequencing of a given set of cost functions over the bouts (electronic supplementary material, appendix S1).
(i) Variation in ES care with number of bouts
As the number of bouts, T, increases, the total amount of care, and the fitness benefit through the offspring, B, total fitness cost to the parent, C and fitness of the parent, B2C, all remain constant ( figure 3b,c) . This is not surprising, given the adjustment in the cost function per bout so that when care is spread evenly, the total cost is independent of the number of bouts (see §2). However, the adjustment provides a means for comparing the effects of the number of bouts when parents care alone or together (see below).
(c) Repeated bouts of investment: parents care together When the parents care together for the family, and the parental cost function is the same for all bouts of care, the pattern of parental care through the rearing period differs from that when parents care alone: instead of remaining constant, parental care increases (figure 3a and see electronic supplementary material, appendix S1 for the general case). As when parents care alone, the direct costs to a parent's residual fitness would be minimized by an equal spread of care. However, when parents care together, there is a second cost to parental care provided early in the rearing period, because it reduces the ES amount of care later in the rearing period not only by the parent who provided the care, but also by their mate. In other words, effort made by one of the pair early in the rearing period can be exploited by the other. Because of this, the ES levels of care are lower initially than when parents divide the family and increase in successive bouts of investment, with the level of care in at least the final bout being higher when the parents care together than if they divide the family (figure 3a and see electronic supplementary material, appendix S1 for the general case).
In general (when the parental care functions may vary between bouts and parents), the slopes of each of the two parental cost curves for the final bout equal the slope of the offspring benefit curve at the ESS (electronic supplementary material, appendix S1, equation (S1.11)). In earlier bouts, the slopes of the two parental cost curves may not be equal at the ESS, and are always lower than the slope of the same parent's parental cost curve in the following bout. The factor by which the slope of the cost curve is reduced is equal to the amount that the other parent would reduce its care in the following bout in relation to increasing offspring mass at the end of the current bout (electronic supplementary material, appendix S1, equation (S1.27)); i.e. the amount by which care by one parent will be exploited by the other in the next bout. The implications of this are twofold: first, the slope of the cost function of a parent caring together with the other parent, relative to that when the family is divided, will increase through the rearing period. As a result, the amount of care given when caring together, relative to that when the family is divided, will tend to increase during the rearing period. The amount of care given when caring together compared with when the family is divided will always be lower in the first bout, and higher in the last bout. This prediction applies more generally than that given above for the numerical model, because it does not depend on the assumption that the cost function is the same for the two parents, and in each of the bouts. The second implication is that the pattern of parental care over the rearing period by parents of one sex depends on whether the other sex of parent modifies its investment in relation to the growth of offspring. Unless a parent can tell whether its individual mate does this, the ES pattern of care of one sex of parent will depend on the monitoring behaviour of the other sex of parent in the population as a whole.
Parents provide a smaller total amount of care when they care together than when dividing the family (figure 3b), so the fitness benefit through the offspring, B, is also smaller (figure 3c). In addition, parental costs are lower (but higher than for the same amount of care spread evenly over the rearing period), but not sufficiently to offset the reduction in benefit through the offspring, so parental fitness, B2C, is also lower (figure 3c). This contrasts with the situation when there is only one bout of investment, where the amount of care and fitness consequences do not depend on whether the parents care together or divide the family. If instead of the family being divided, one parent cares for all the offspring, the amount of care provided by the parent is substantially greater than that under biparental care, but because only one parent provides care, the offspring receive considerably less care (figure 3b). As a result, the fitness benefit through the offspring, B, total fitness cost to the caring parent, C, and fitness of the caring parent, B2C, are lower than in undivided families (not shown; (see also [8] )).
(i) Variation in ES care with number of bouts When the parents care together and the parental cost function is the same for all bouts of care, an increase in the number of bouts of investment, T, decreases the total amount of care, fitness benefit through the offspring, B, total fitness cost to the parent, C, and fitness of the parent, B -C ( figure 3b,c) . The biggest decreases occur when care is spread over two bouts, instead of one bout, of investment. This is consistent with the biggest increase in care per bout occurring between the penultimate and final bouts of investment ( figure 3a) . With the fitness functions used in the models presented here, as the number of bouts of investment increases from one to 10, the terminal mass of the offspring decreases by about 8.6 per cent, and their resultant fitness by about 7.4 per cent, while the fitness cost to the parent decreases by only 3.7 per cent (because their care becomes spread unevenly between bouts). Overall, parental fitness decreases by about 5.8 per cent. Thus, negotiation over repeated bouts of investment results in a lower overall amount and different temporal pattern of care, and lower offspring and parental fitness.
(ii) Parents differ in their cost functions If the two parents differ in their cost functions, there is still an increase in the ES amount of care through the rearing period. With the cost and benefit functions used here, the absolute difference in the amount of care provided in different bouts remains (approximately) constant (figure 4). Figure 5 shows how the total amounts of care, and fitness, of each of the parents varies with their relative quality. The quality of parent 1 varies, but the quality of parent 2 is the same in all cases, so that the curves for parent 1 show how care given and fitness vary with a parent's own quality, and the curves for parent 2 show how these vary with a parent's mate's quality. The amount of care given increases with a parent's own quality, and decreases with its mate's quality, and the higher quality parent gives more care. Parental fitness increases with both a parent's own quality and that of its mate. However, the higher quality parent has lower fitness than the lower quality parent (with the offspring benefit and parental cost functions used here).
(iii) How costs and benefits combine across bouts The above model assumes that the overall benefit through offspring depends on the total amount of care received by an offspring, and the overall cost is the sum of costs in individual bouts. Different assumptions about how costs and benefits combine across bouts give different predictions about the ES pattern of care (table 1 and electronic supplementary material, appendix S1). Strikingly, if it is the overall cost that depends on the total amount of care given, and the overall benefit is the sum of benefits in individual bouts, the pattern of care and parental fitness are the same, whether the family is divided or not (provided that the cost functions for different bouts are such that the ES ratio of care by the two parents is the same in all bouts, and the family is divided in this ratio). This is because both parents benefit from care by either parent, but pay only the cost of their own care. As a result, care in early bouts can be exploited by the other parent in a later bout if benefits depend on the total amount of care received (from either parent), but not if costs depend on the total amount of care given (by the individual parent). In the two remaining cases (overall cost and benefit either both depend on the total amount of care given or received, or are both the sum of the costs or benefits per bout), the ES total amount of care and parental fitness also do not depend on whether the family is divided or not (again provided that the cost functions for different bouts are such that the ES ratio of care by the two parents is the same in all bouts, and the family is divided by this ratio).
DISCUSSION
The model presented here shows that when parents make repeated bouts of investment, the overall amount and temporal pattern of care will differ between parents caring together, or dividing the family and caring alone for part of it. When parents care alone, the amount of care given per bout is constant throughout the rearing period (if the parental cost function is the same in each bout), but increases through the rearing period when parents care together because higher levels of care by one parent early in the rearing period can be exploited by the other parent reducing their later care. As a result, the overall amount of care, and fitness of the parents and offspring, is lower when the parents care together than when they divide the family. This difference between undivided and divided families does not occur when there is only a single bout of investment. Therefore, negotiation over repeated bouts of investment reduces parental and offspring fitness.
In our model, parents monitor the amount of care that offspring have previously received. In a population where neither sex monitors previous care, parental care over the rearing period becomes a single sealed bid (equivalent to the Houston -Davies model), even if care is given in repeated bouts. In this case, the ES pattern of care when parents care together is the same as in a divided family. The ES pattern of care in one sex depends on the monitoring behaviour of parents of the other sex in the population as a whole, so in a population where neither sex monitors offspring state, a mutant of either sex cannot gain by unilaterally altering its pattern of investment or beginning to monitor offspring state, unless there is some other selection pressure for doing so, such as variation in parental provisioning owing to luck while foraging. In a population in which individuals The high-quality parent has a g-value (1.875 Â 10 25 ) which is one half of that of the low-quality parent (3.75 Â 10 25 ), so that the high-quality parent gives two thirds of the care in the final bout of investment, and an even higher proportion in successively earlier bouts. do monitor investment, all individuals of one sex have the same pattern of care at the ESS. A mutant that changed its pattern of care would be selected against, but a mutant that stopped monitoring (but maintained the same pattern of care) would not, and the mutation could initially spread by drift. However, a decreasing frequency of monitoring by one sex would select for a more uniform pattern of care in the other sex, which would in turn select against the non-monitoring mutants. Therefore, an exogenous selection pressure is needed for monitoring to evolve in the first place, but once evolved will be ES, even if the original selection pressures no longer act, because of the opportunity that it offers to exploit the other parent's investment.
When there are repeated bouts of investment, the ESS depends on how the costs and benefits of care combine across bouts. Only when the overall benefit depends on the total amount of care, but the overall cost is the sum of the costs per bout (as in the model presented in §2b), does the ESS involve negotiation by modifying the amount of care given in relation to the amount of care that the offspring have previously received. Benefits and costs may combine at least partially in this way: benefits may depend on the total amount of care if the subsequent fitness of offspring depends on their size or condition at independence [12] , and costs may depend on the amount of care provided in individual bouts if care increases short-term work rate [13] . Benefits and costs also combine probably at least partially in the converse way: catch up growth may have fitness costs [14] , so that periods when care is reduced impact on overall fitness, even when the offspring receive the same total amount of care, and costs may depend on the total amount of care if they are invoked through depletion of body reserves over the whole breeding period [15] . Negotiation is likely to occur and lead to a reduction in parental care, provided that benefits and costs combine over bouts at least partially as in the model described in §2b.
In McNamara et al. 's [4] model, the need for negotiation is driven by variation in the quality of the parents which is not known by the other parent before negotiation begins, whereas in the models presented here, partner quality is known, and negotiation is selected by the opportunity it offers to exploit the care given by the other parent. McNamara et al.'s model makes three sets of testable predictions: first, an experimentally widowed parent may provide more care than a pair caring together [8] . However, one of the parents is expected to desert in this case, so biparental care should not be observed in species where this applies. A possible non-experimental example occurs in rock sparrows Petronia petronia [16] , but is open to other interpretations [6] . Second, an experimentally widowed parent may provide more care than would be expected on the basis of its response to an experimentally induced reduction in the care provided by its mate left in situ [8] . This prediction is met in house sparrows Passer domesticus [17] , and male burying beetles Nicrophorus quadripunctatus [18] . Third, parents will provide more care, the offspring have higher fitness, and the parents higher costs and higher net fitness when the family is divided than when the parents care together [8, 19] . All but the last (which could not be tested) of this third set of predictions were met in an experimental study of captive zebra finches Taeniopygia guttata [19] . The first prediction has not been investigated systematically in the current model, but it seems unlikely that the model makes this prediction ( figure 3b) . However, the current model also makes predictions two (a parent caring alone would provide more care to offspring of a given mass, than if their mate was present to provide care) and three. In addition, the current model predicts that the temporal pattern of care is different when the family is divided than when the parents care together, with the level of care initially higher in divided families but decreasing relative to undivided families during the remainder of the rearing period. This could be tested in an experiment like that carried out on zebra finches [19] .
Finally, McNamara et al.'s model emphasizes the need for models in which negotiation and investment take place simultaneously. The current model does this, but only for cases in which individuals know the quality of their mate (populations with no within-sex variation in quality, or where there are reliable cues or signals to mate quality). In populations with within-sex variation in quality that is not known by the partner before negotiation begins, care in early bouts would potentially be both parental investment (with parental costs and offspring benefits) and a signal of parental quality. Our model shows that the ES care by a parent is higher when its mate is of low quality, so that a parent might be selected to care less in early bouts-signalling poor quality-in order to elicit more parental care from its mate. Such signalling carries the cost of reducing parental care below the level that is ES in the absence of any benefit mediated by signalling. Future uses of our model therefore include answering the currently open question of whether care can be an honest signal of parental quality in negotiation over parental investment.
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